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The common view in the organizations literature is that, in the new economy, traditional 
worker hierarchies have now been replaced by flat, team-based arrangements.  However, 
there have been few empirical studies that have tested this phenomenon.  This paper seeks to 
fill this gap in the literature by evaluating the worker hierarchies of small and medium-sized 
software companies.  By drawing on 61 in-depth interviews with workers and managers at 31 
software companies, I assess several dimensions of organizational hierarchy.  I found that 
worker hierarchies do not match our conceptions of traditional bureaucratic models, but 
formal hierarchies do remain, albeit with fewer layers.  Management has relinquished 
decision-making on high-level decisions, while workers have gained more decision-making 
in production-level decisions and autonomy. I also outline the characteristics of new project-
based hierarchies, which are more flexible worker hierarchies in which supervisory and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
  
In “The Coming of the New Organization” (1988), management guru Peter 
Drucker describes what new business organizations will look like “20 years hence”.  
He compares the new organizational structure to a symphony: “A large symphony 
orchestra is … instructive, since for some works there may be a few hundred 
musicians on stage playing together … There is only the conductor-CEO and 
everyone of the musicians plays directly to that person without an intermediary.  And 
each is a high grade specialist” (Drucker 1988: 48).  In this metaphor, workers have 
specialized roles, but are not differentiated by rank and authority.  They work and 
communicate with one another horizontally, but are not organized into a hierarchy.  
Vertical separation between all workers and the head of the organization is 
characterized by direct contact, rather than many layers of middle management. 
 As we converge on Drucker’s prediction, it is an opportune moment to reflect 
on the extent of changes to organizational hierarchy and its meanings for workers.  
Indeed, there has been much attention on this subject in the interim.  A myriad of 
social analysts in various disciplines have noted the flatter, more egalitarian structures 
of work organizations in the modern capitalist economy.  Trends have been identified 
in the delayering of corporate hierarchies, employee empowerment, workplace 
democracy, and increasing worker autonomy (e.g. Piore and Sabel 1984; Jaffee 2001; 
Coleman 1996; Burris 1998; Rajan and Wulf 2006).   These changes have unfolded in 




manufacturing and the apparel industry (Applebaum et al. 2000).  However, changes 
have been most profound in the new high-tech firms of the knowledge economy.   
For obvious reasons, organizational structure is an important focus for 
organizational scholars and practitioners.  But for sociologists, it has long been an 
important area of stratification research (dating back to Weber’s classic study of 
bureaucracy).  As Joan Acker (2006) argues, “work organizations are critical 
locations for the investigation of the continuous creation of complex inequalities 
because much societal inequality originates in such organizations.”  Greater 
understanding of the trends in organizational hierarchy, therefore, is particularly 
salient for improving our knowledge of inequality.  While much evidence has 
established the lessening of hierarchy, it is not clear if hierarchy has been replaced by 
flat, egalitarian teams as many commentators suggest (Cloke and Goldsmith, 2002; 
Stewart, 1997; Kanter 1989), or to what degree hierarchy remains, and how it is 
perceived by workers. 
Improving our knowledge about organizational hierarchy also has important 
implications for the burgeoning debates on organizational democracy and the nature 
of work.  Stohl and Cheney argue that participation has become a “fundamental social 
right of people in the workplace that has value in and of itself” (Stohl and Cheney, 
2001: 351).  If business organizations have demonstrated an ability to maintain flat 
structures with high participation, we can more thoroughly assess the compatibility of 
democracy for profit-seeking entities (see e.g. Bernstein and Berger, 1998).  
Similarly, many observers conclude that the new flatter forms are more humanistic 




(Collom, 2003).  Radical theorists argue that their increased autonomy, active 
participation, and flattened organizational structure are means for workers to 
recognize that management and capitalist relations are not necessary and organize 
themselves into a new communism (Negri, 1989/2005; Dyer-Witheford, 1999).   
The pressures toward less hierarchical structures have been economic, and in 
some cases, cultural in nature.  Flattened hierarchies are thought to increase 
productivity through a variety of means.  In contrast to the hierarchical Fordist 
organizations that used Taylor’s scientific management, the new organizational 
structures are thought to maximize worker participation and “discretionary effort” 
(Applebaum et al. 2000).  By shifting decision-making authority to workers and 
enabling them to alter their routines and the production process, organizations gain by 
harnessing their skills and tacit knowledge while increasing motivation and 
flexibility. 
While economic forces have placed external pressure on companies to raise 
productivity through organizational restructuring, cultural factors have acted 
internally.  Workers in the knowledge economy constitute a “creative class” that is 
motivated by and demands greater authority in their work (Florida 2002).  In software 
development, this “creative core” represents a distinct “computing culture” 
(Woodfield 2000).  One of the quintessential elements of this computing culture is the 
raised importance of technical skills over traditional forms of rank and hierarchy.  
Andrew Ross, in his ethnography of a cutting-edge software company, characterized 
this work culture as “an anti-authority work mentality” that “over time … grew its 




different expectations of software workers, as highly valuable employees, have 
further shaped the organization of work.   
There is, however, reason to expect limitations to the flattening of hierarchy 
and the prospects for egalitarian working arrangements in profit-seeking enterprises.  
Writing within a Marxist theoretical framework, labor process scholars focus on the 
role of management in transforming labor power into labor through control of the 
labor process.  As Bray and Littler (1988: 567) note, “this hierarchical control relation 
is part of the economic exchange relations of capitalism which require the constant 
generation of surplus value and accumulation of capital.”  While management is 
interested in empowering workers to harness their skills and knowledge, they also 
recognize that workers’ decisions may diverge from the interests of management that 
seek to maximize surplus.  These structural interests emerge from the relationship 
between labor and management and necessitates a hierarchical structure whereby 
management maintains control.   
Given these competing pressures, it is not clear how they materialize in 
organizational structures and daily work experiences.  Their dialectical relationship 
and its organizational blueprint are the focus of this study.  Each of these three forces 
(economic, cultural, and political economic) will be explored in detail below to better 
determine the mechanisms at work.  This will create the backdrop for the empirical 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
The Social Organization of Work in the Knowledge Economy 
 The organization of work has changed significantly in the US since the post-
World War II boom.  Until the 1970s, businesses were organized in hierarchical 
Fordist structures that produced standardized products for mass markets.  These large 
bureaucratic structures were characterized by inflexible career ladders and chains of 
command.  Using Taylor’s “scientific management”, decisions were made higher up 
in the hierarchy and dictated to those blow.  This signified a clear separation between 
conception and execution (Braverman 1974).  Among workers, there was a highly 
specialized division of labor.  Workers lost nearly all decision-making authority and 
jobs were highly alienating.  All levels of the hierarchy were characterized by 
unambiguous positions of rank and authority.  Workers, and their unions, acquiesced 
to this system in exchange for their share of the surplus in a time of rapidly rising 
living standards.  Productivity continued to rise and business prospered. 
 Beginning in the early 1970s, productivity growth slowed sharply and 
American business faced increasing competition in an expanding world market 
(Harrison and Bluestone 1990).  Deregulation and double-digit inflation from two oil 
shocks compounded pressures in the new competitive environment.  Many businesses 
filed or were on the verge of bankruptcy, such as Chrysler, which required a taxpayer 




costs, but failed to raise productivity.  It became clear that rigid hierarchies 
employing scientific management were often inefficient (Jaffee 2001; Heckscher 
1994).  Workers disengaged from the production process were not able or motivated 
to share their tacit knowledge of the work.  Elaborate hierarchies prevented timely 
flow of accurate information.  Clear positions of rank and authority made the labor 
process inflexible and organizations were slow to adapt.  Increasingly, businesses 
looked toward the organization of work to improve productivity, and Japan became 
the new model (Alcaly 2003; Jaffee 2001).   
 New computer technologies were also important to improving productivity.  
Not only did they perform labor-saving tasks, but they encouraged the delayering of 
hierarchies (Alcaly 2003).  They facilitated horizontal communication and quicker 
learning across the organization and diminished the need for managerial controls.  
Workers regained some autonomy and were granted decision-making authority in a 
variety of contexts.  These changes provided greater opportunities for workers to use 
their skills, share their tacit knowledge, and motivated them to do so.  Their 
empowerment gave them the opportunity to alter how work was organized 
(Applebaum et al. 2000).   
Transforming layers of hierarchy into teams opened channels of 
communication and facilitated further organizational changes and decision-making 
(Alcaly 2003).  Total Quality Management (TQM) and autonomous teams became the 
favorite forms of restructuring (Harley 1999).  These team organizations are said to 
be self-managing and they coordinate themselves horizontally with other teams, 




restructuring was often complemented with other techniques in these “high-
performance work systems,” such as just-in-time inventories, small batch production, 
incentive systems, and skill upgrading  to improve flexibility and participation 
(Applebaum et al. 2000).  This qualitative shift in the organization of production was 
famously labeled the “second industrial divide” and marked the transition to a Post-
Fordist economy (Piore and Sabel, 1984).   
 While these new organizational structures and practices have been adopted in 
traditional manufacturing industries (Applebaum et al. 2000), they are most 
pronounced in high technology sectors of the knowledge economy.  For example, 
studies have demonstrated an association between “the use of sophisticated 
technology and skill to the adoption of high-performance work practices” (Kalleberg 
et al. 2006: 279), which include flattened hierarchies and greater worker autonomy 
(Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Gittleman et al., 1998; Osterman, 1994; Pil and 
MacDuffie, 1996; Burris 1998).  Of the high tech sectors adopting the new approach, 
software production is particularly noted for it because of its dependence on rapid 
innovation and highly creative work.   
These changes have led some commentators to declare that hierarchy is 
obsolete and that flat, egalitarian structures are the new mode of capitalist 
organization in the knowledge economy (Kanter 1989).  Stewart (1997: 192) explains 
“how technology destroyed the hierarchy” and that “the flat, networked organization 
triumphs because the underlying economics of communication and control have 
changed in favor of small flexible organizations, not big ones.”  Cloke and Goldsmith 




managerial approaches to organizational change” and that we are witnessing the 
transformation into “organizations of, by, and for both the people who work in them 
and the people they serve, without distinctions based on race, gender, social class, 
condition of ownership, or position in organizational hierarchy.”  While these views 
are at the extreme end, they are part of a large body of literature making claim to this 
powerful trend toward flatness. 
In this literature, these work “practices are generally assumed to have replaced 
hierarchical systems of control characteristic of Taylorist or Fordist production 
regimes by a form of work organization that empowers workers to participate in 
decision making, enables them to work in teams, and enhances their commitment to 
the organization” (Kalleberg et al., 2006: 272).  However, they have largely ignored 
the actual existence of levels of hierarchy among high-tech workers, and relationships 
between these workers.  While numerous scholars have noted a “lessening of 
hierarchy” and identified new work practices, they have missed the ways or the 
degree to which these organizations have flattened out and what types of decision-
making has been devolved to teams of workers because of a dearth of empirical 
studies. 
 
Computing Culture and Hierarchy 
 While economic forces have placed external pressure toward organizational 
restructuring, cultural factors have acted internally.  Through the construction of 
specific norms, attitudes, values, practices, and expectations, culture can influence 




culture have varied widely in the social sciences and it requires clear elucidation of 
the cultural context relevant here (Kunda 1992).  I use the concept of a computing 
culture here in a specific sense—one that relates to a specific of subgroup people and 
not in the broad context of American or western culture.  In particular, I differentiate 
computing culture from the cyberculture studies that have gained significant attention 
since the late 1990s. 
Cyberculture refers to “the set of technologies (material and intellectual), 
practices, attitudes, modes of thought, and values that developed along with the 
growth of cyberspace” (Lévy 2001: xvi).  Empirically, cyberculture has been studied 
in relation to the internet (Bell 2001).  Its diverse application has covered online 
communities (Wellman 1997; Wellman and Gulia 1999), online identity (see Turkle 
1995 for the classic study), cybersubcultures (see Bell 2001, chapter 8), and other 
related topics.  Conceptually, cyberculture is a nebulous structure.  It captures many 
different types of people with many different types of relationships to computers and 
the knowledge economy.  Instead, I focus on a more specific culture. 
 The culture relevant to this study is the social group of computing 
professionals who “eat, breathe, and sleep code.”  Like the “ethos” of Florida’s 
“creative class”, it is bounded by specific occupations (Florida 2002).  These 
computing professionals comprise much of the workforce of software companies and 
computing departments in companies of the knowledge economy.  They are part of 
the “super-creative core” of the creative class.  They cohabit much of the same social 




values, that are distinct from other cultural spaces1.  The computing culture is much 
closer to the “creative ethos” of the creative class, but is even more specific.  
Much of the literature and inhabitants of this cultural space define them as 
hackers (e.g. Himanen 2001).  While mainstream media and pop culture have referred 
to malicious computer programmers as hackers, the traditional sense of the word is 
closer to those individuals inculcated in the computing culture.  Even though the field 
has still produced a relatively modest number of empirical studies on computing 
culture, there are a number of consistent themes that capture its “quintessential 
character” (Woodfield 2000).  Several authors have identified a “core ideology” of 
this computing culture, with common norms and values.   
Perhaps the strongest element of the computing culture is their passion for 
their work, or their “hacker work ethic” (Himanen 2001).  Hackers write and design 
programs because they find the work intrinsically interesting.  They tend to be 
motivated more by this passion than the money that their employment provides 
(which can be significant).  Challenging programs can draw the most interest and 
excitement, perhaps because they demand the greatest creativity.  This culture 
encourages and rewards the most “beautiful” or “aesthetically appealing” code (Case 
and Piñeiro 2006). 
 Secondly, computing culture emphasizes knowledge sharing and open access.  
Computing culture has its roots in open-source software and free access.  Before 
commercial computing became an attractive opportunity, early computer 
professionals survived through reciprocity and in a “culture of knowledge sharing, 
                                               
1 See Woodfield (2000, pages 9-12) for a more thorough argument of why computing may be 




continuous improving, and sharing of software” (Bergquist 2003: 225).  These roots 
of early computing culture have been institutionally reproduced through the open-
source movement, actions against censorship, and expansion of computer and internet 
access.  Computing professionals have helped lead the broader cyberculture drive for 
greater access and free distribution of knowledge, through organizations such as the 
Free Software Foundation and the “copyleft” movement (Bergquist 2003). 
The third and perhaps most pertinent cultural element to this study is attitudes 
against hierarchy and authority.  According to Himanen, the computing culture has 
“always been anti-authoritarian” and “hackers oppose hierarchical operation” on both 
normative and pragmatic grounds (Himanen 2001: 70).  Hackers are encouraged to 
“mistrust authority—promote decentralization” and “hackers are to be judged by their 
hacking, not bogus criteria, such as degrees, age, race, or position” (Levy 1984, 
quoted in Turner 2006: 261).  Andrew Ross, in his ethnography of a cutting-edge 
software company, characterized this work culture as “an anti-authority work 
mentality” (Ross 2003: 9).   
 This “core ideology” of computing culture is reproduced in chat rooms, on 
FAQ documents, project manuals, and specialized conferences.  A growing number 
of scholars have studied this computing culture in these various domains.  For 
example, Case and Piñeiro (2006) studied an online programmer community that 
talked passionately about their coding as an art form, emphasizing coding aesthetics.  
Cultural reproduction in the open-source movement has gained particular attention 




studied in more general terms at workplaces (Bloomfield 1989; Ross 2003) and 
schools (Sproull et al. 1984). 
 However, as Woodfield argues, “fewer commentators have examined the way 
in which elements of the wider cultural framework itself can influence and determine 
the nature of the immediate computing environment, or have reflected in detail upon 
the way the nature of the immediate context continues to surround and shape the 
production of the technology” (Woodfield 2000: 9).  Specifically, it is not clear how 
this computing culture affects organizational structure or if organizational objectives 
are congruent with computing’s “core ideology.”  One might reasonably expect that 
in conjunction with management paradigms that emphasize horizontal, team-based 
production, a culture that disdains authority, centralized power, and position based on 
rank, that software firms and workers in particular would be organized into flat, 
egalitarian structures. 
 
The Labor Process and Hierarchical Control 
In contrast to the flat organizational models and an anti-hierarchical 
computing culture, labor process theory disputes claims that hierarchies are a thing of 
the past, or that capitalist relations can achieve an egalitarian organization.  Drawing 
on Marxist principles of political economy, this literature focuses on the hierarchical 
relationship between managers and workers in the labor process.  In this relationship, 
the function of management is to convert workers’ labor power (the potential to 
work) into labor (actual work effort) to further capital accumulation (Braverman 




their own interests, at the expense of management’s (or the capitalist’s) interests.  “To 
the extent that individual or collective worker resistance interferes with it, 
management will be concerned to ‘control’ labor” (Bray and Littler 1988).   
 Like mainstream approaches, labor process scholars have adapted their 
theories to the broad organizational changes in capitalist firms.  They recognize, for 
instance, the adoption of TQM, work teams, and increased autonomy.  Of particular 
importance is the role of information and creativity in the knowledge economy.  
When managers have extended Taylorist control mechanisms to knowledge workers, 
such as computer programmers and software engineers, they have had poor results 
(Kraft 1999).  These techniques stifle the flow of information and are not conducive 
to creative work (Andrews et al. 2005; Florida 2002).  Within capitalistic enterprises 
“managers seeking to extract the greatest value from ‘creative’ workers need to 
manipulate not only behavior but imagination” (Kraft 1999: 21).  These 
organizational pressures have shifted the attention away from scientific management 
toward construction of a workplace culture that attempts “to elicit and direct the 
required efforts of members by controlling the underlying experiences, thoughts, and 
feelings that guide their actions” (Kunda 1992: 11). 
Rather than accepting these schemes of worker empowerment as new-found 
egalitarianism, labor process theorists point to the reconfiguration of control 
hierarchies.  As Ezzamel and Willmott (1998: 359) note, “the intent to abolish some 
features of [the traditional management] system, such as close supervision, should not 
be uncritically conflated with the dilution or demise of an established top-down 




both “control and inspire” knowledge work in these organizations.  They construct a 
cultural environment that facilitates or “inspires” creative work, while simultaneously 
guiding, redirecting, and placing limits upon the work.  These management interests 
often conflict with the workers’ interests (Applebaum et al. 2000) and their 
computing culture (Himanen 2001).  Subsequently, “a firm’s culture may be 
understood as resulting from political processes where many different cultures 
compete for hegemony, rather than a monolithic, unified system of shared values and 
norms developed and promoted by management as described in the corporate culture 
tradition” (Rasmussen and Johansen 2005: 102), or a similarly monolithic culture of 
the hacker ethic.  An important point is that these political processes are indeed 
mediated by positions of authority and ownership within the organization.  The 
resulting control structures include specific workplace practices, organizational 
cultures and normative controls, and finally, (sometimes hidden) organizational 
hierarchies.   
These competing cultures, and the organizational hierarchies they engender, 
can be sources of conflict within the organization.  Programmers who are motivated 
by passion and the intrinsic interest of programming, seek interesting and challenging 
projects, but capitalist organizations choose projects based on greater profitability 
(Himanen 2001). While spaces of creativity are necessary in the labor process, the 
maximization and exhibition of this creativity and mastery in “aesthetically 
appealing” or “beautiful” code can hinder capitalistic objectives for quicker, 
functional product delivery.  Case and Piñeiro (2006), in their study of an online 




rhetoric and activity of participants.  Participants directed their incendiary rhetoric at 
those with authority over them, including project managers and others having 
hierarchical relationships to them.  Non-technical superiors are particularly common 
sources of conflict (e.g. see Lewis 1999; Zmud 1982; Burris 1998).  These conflicts 
may be further compounded by the tension between creating software with free 
access versus proprietary software for maximum profit. 
Recent qualitative studies have identified new strategies of control in 
managing the labor process of knowledge work.  For example, several studies have 
shown that by using “soft control” (Florida 2002), workers “who are offered 
autonomy over their work, including autonomy over their working time, are 
motivated by this (Bailyn, 1988) and are willing to work long hours (Barrett, 2005; 
Voss-Dahm, 2005)” (Rasmussen and Johansen, 2005: 102).  Others have explored 
how identity (Marks and Lockyer, 2005) and organizational policies (Baldry et al., 
2005) facilitate control and the extraction of greater value.  However, these practices 
exist within organizational structures that have not been sufficiently explored.  In 
much of the literature, organizational structure and the labor process are typically 
conflated (Ezzamel and Willmott, 1998), but demand a greater focus in light of 
current debates.  Almost no empirical studies have assessed the flatness of 
organizational hierarchy and critical scholarship has focused on the newer modes of 
cultural control (Kunda 1992), while ignoring modes of control exercised through 
organizational structures.  When researchers have assessed the “flat thesis”, they have 




ignoring the organization of worker hierarchies.  A more nuanced analysis of 
organizational hierarchies may reveal increasingly complex stratification structures. 
 
 




Chapter 3: Theory and Research Questions 
 
 
This study seeks a grounded approach toward new forms of organizing work 
in the post-industrial economy, focusing on software firms as exemplary of the 
knowledge economy.  While much of the literature has described it as a vague 
“lessening of hierarchy”, many others have made more bold (but often less 
empirically rigorous) arguments.  They argue that new horizontal coordinating 
mechanisms such as teams (Marchington, 1992) utilizing TQM and other HPWP 
(Applebaum et al., 2000) have “destroyed the hierarchy” (Stewart, 1997) and ushered 
in new workplace democracies (Cloke and Goldsmith, 2002).  Managers support 
these organizations because of greater efficiency, and workers inculcated in the 
computing culture identify with the decentralized “hacker ethic” (Himanen, 2001) 
and its “anti-authority work mentality” (Ross, 2001: 9).  This study asks are these 
organizational structures as flat and egalitarian as they are thought to be?   
 Much of this literature implicitly and explicitly conceives of this transition as 
an act of replacement (e.g. Kalleberg et al., 2006).  As hierarchical structures 
diminish (approaching absolute dissolution), horizontal coordinating mechanisms are 
developed proportionally.  This transformation is subsequently interpreted by scholars 
and practitioners as democratic and egalitarian.  However, the literature errs by 
conflating “processes of coordination … with structures of control” (Ezzamel and 
Willmott, 1998: 362).  This conceptual distinction is of utmost importance to this 




hierarchical structures of control.  For example, teams of empowered workers may be 
organized horizontally, but be assigned to specific projects conceptualized by those 
above them.  Workers may be free to determine how tasks are carried out, but work 
within prescribed parameters.  Furthermore, these hierarchical structures may be 
characterized by varying degrees of formality and informality.   
Critical scholarship from within Marxian labor process theory has illustrated 
this distinction.  Rather than emerging from a natural and functional necessity, these 
hierarchical structures remain because of the structural imperative of capitalist 
organizations.  Workers’ interests may be structurally different (Ezzamel and Willmot 
1998; Applebaum et al. 2000: 8) and often overtly opposed to the interests of 
management.  To the extent that this is the case, managers construct both normative 
and organizational controls to ensure that their interests are met.  These controls may 
result in both formal and informal organizational hierarchies.  To evaluate these 
hierarchies (or lack thereof) in software firms, I am concerned with three separate but 
highly related questions. 
 First, what formal positions do workers occupy in the organizational 
structure?  Titles differentiate workers from one another, but organizational contexts 
attribute ranking and ordering of these positions.  The focus here is on how workers 
are arranged, relative to one another (i.e. who reports and is responsible to who).  Are 
workers arranged horizontally in teams with direct reporting to a CEO (similar to 
Drucker’s symphony metaphor)?  Or are they arranged in vertical hierarchies and 
interface with middle management (bearing resemblance to traditional 




and development of software products.  I do not evaluate managers who focus 
exclusively on managing developers or the organization.  One could similarly look at 
the management structure, but this is beyond the scope of this study.   
 Second, how is decision-making authority distributed among workers?  Since 
Weber, authority over decision-making has always been a key attribute in the study of 
hierarchy and bureaucracy.  In a hierarchical organization, decisions are made from 
above and dictated to those below.  In this way, workers receive orders rather than 
make decisions.  In flat structures, all members participate in decision-making, 
perhaps as individuals, or in groups through voting and committees.  These may 
range from high-level decisions such as budgeting, hirings and promotions, and 
setting policies and procedures, to lower level decisions including task assignments, 
setting deadlines, and task execution.  It is often taken for granted that workers do not 
participate in strategic company decisions, but this remains an important component 
of hierarchical control and inequality (Acker 2006).  Higher-level decision-making is 
also still very important for workers because such decisions have daily impact on 
workers and the organization of work.  It is logical to assume that the degree of 
flatness will coincide with the devolution and sharing of such decision-making.  I 
follow Wright et al. (1995) in viewing decision-making authority as separate and 
unique from offering input and advice. 
Third, do workers experience upward mobility in their organizations?  As 
Barley and Kunda (2001: 87) state, “hierarchy not only defines the distribution of 
authority in a bureaucracy, it provides a blueprint for constructing organizational 




Generally, but not always, such a move will result in greater decision-making 
authority and supervisory/managerial responsibilities over subordinates.  This is 
contrasted with horizontal mobility, where workers may attain new formal positions 
with new specialization, but without new authority and power.  This latter movement 
could occur in either flat or hierarchical structures, and is therefore not indicative of 
either.  It is not a focus here. 
These three questions seek to paint a more nuanced picture of hierarchy 
among workers in knowledge economy firms.  They strive to capture the objective 
existence of organizational structure in software companies.  This will subsequently 
improve our understanding of stratification within organizations.    
The nature of this study lends itself to an exploratory analysis.  While 
literatures on the social organization of work, workplace democracies, and computing 
culture suggest pressures toward flatness, labor process theory that hierarchy and 
complex inequalities remain despite these pressures.  It is unclear how these forces 
will bear themselves out in the software companies that are the focus here.  Answers 
to my three research questions can only be found in rigorous empirical analysis in 





Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
 
 
This analysis draws on in-depth interviews with 61 respondents at 31 different 
software companies.  All companies represented in the interviews are considered 
small to medium sized businesses (based on US standards).  At most companies, two 
or three interviews were conducted, including the founder and/or CEO and one or two 
programmers.   
 All interviews were conducted in-person in the summer and fall of 2001 using 
semi-structured questionnaires.  Interviews took place in the Washington, 
DC/Baltimore metropolitan area, home to the third largest concentration of software 
firms in the US.  Initial contacts were identified through personal acquaintances and 
friends.  Subsequent respondents were found through referrals to co-workers, friends, 
and acquaintances using snowball sampling (Weiss, 1994).  Additional respondents 
were recruited by identifying potential subjects in newspaper articles, news releases, 
and web-based directories.  These people were then contacted via phone or email 
requesting interviews with the CEO and a software developer or similar position.  Out 
of a total of about 100 companies that were contacted, interviews were conducted 
with approximately 31.  The remaining companies either declined to participate, 
failed to respond, or postponed participation until a later date.   
While this data is not representative of all software companies, efforts were 
made to construct an appropriate sampling frame.  Companies ranged in size from a 




employees at offices spread around the US.  The smallest companies had only two to 
four full-time employees, but many hired part-time freelance programmers.  The 
largest companies occupied offices on multiple floors in high-profile office buildings.  
Some of these companies also had satellite offices in Europe or had recently closed 
them.  However, given the timing of this data collection (the dot-com bubble burst in 
March of 2000 and effects were continuing to be felt through 2001 and beyond), 
personnel numbers were not entirely stable.  In particular, many companies were 
downsizing and some smaller companies were struggling to survive.  Companies also 
varied in their location within the Washington, DC/Baltimore metropolitan area.  
They were spread around downtown Washington, Baltimore City, suburban 
Maryland, and the Virginia high-tech corridor.  Finally, individual respondents varied 
in terms of their position within the organization, title, and level of responsibility.  
These included senior and non-senior management, workers of various titles, and 
both technical and administrative positions.   
 Interview questions covered titles, mobility, company structure, occupational 
roles, the labor process, and company culture.  The Appendix provides sample 
questions on the questionnaires administered to programmers and technical 
leads/project managers respectively.  Sometimes it was only possible to ask specific 
questions of a single person in a company.  Other times, the same questions were 
asked of multiple people, allowing checks for consistency.  The majority of the 
interviews took place at respondents’ offices.  They averaged one to two hours in 
length, and all interviews were transcribed for data analysis.  The interviews were 




author did not conduct the interviews and therefore transcripts are treated as 
secondary data. 
 The exploratory nature of this research lends itself to an inductive approach.  
During the course of data collection, the use of a semi-structured questionnaire 
permitted modifications as new themes arose or specific topics required further 
probing.  This research design incorporates a grounded theory methodology, which 
emphasizes theory construction from data (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Charmaz 1983).  
This is further employed throughout the data analysis. 
Consistent with grounded theory principles, themes were first identified in the 
interview data.  By first reading through interview transcripts, I constructed several 
themes related to hierarchy in software companies.  I then developed a list of search 
terms that corresponded to each theme.  Using the software package Atlas/ti, I 
systematically searched all 61 transcripts for each instance of the search terms.  The 
search terms enabled me to identify relevant quotes/phrases and based on these 
quotes, I acquired new search terms that were then used to continue my search 
(search terms were also obtained from the literature).  In grounded theory, this 
process of linking quotes to emergent themes is called coding.   
As the coding process continued, the software package enabled me to merge 
or delete redundant codes, while new codes could be further assigned to emergent 
themes.  This coding occurred concurrently with readings from the literature in an on-
going process that integrates the data with existing literature.  During this process of 




several memos that facilitated the inductive development of new concepts.  The 
software’s functionality permits such memos to be connected to these codes.   
When all coding was completed, I was left with a refined list of relevant codes 
with many quotes connected to each code.  However, these quotes represented both 
supporting and disconfirming evidence for each particular theme.  To evaluate the 
strength of each theme, I constructed a data matrix (Miles and Huberman 1984).  This 
matrix consisted of columns of supporting and disconfirming evidence for each theme 
and each respondent.  The matrix served as a visual aid to identify the relative support 
for each theme and facilitated the identification of clusters of relevant data.  This 
technique prevents making claims on scant or ambiguous evidence.   
The use of interviews with both workers and management is a unique facet of 
this study.  Not only did this allow me to generate better images of work 
organizations through multiple perspectives, it provided valuable insights from 
individuals performing the actual development work.  While most studies exploring 
organizational structure, coordination mechanisms, and HPWP have used surveys 
answered by human resource administrators and managers (e.g. Osterman 2000; 
Eriksson 2001; Caroli and Van Reenen 2001), these miss the perspective of the 
workers themselves (Applebaum et al. 2000).  Such one-sided views may not 
necessarily reflect worker relationships, decision-making, and mobility opportunities, 
and are greatly enriched when complemented by interviews with workers.  While a 
handful of ethnographic studies (Ross 2003; Woodfield 2000; Barker 1993) have 
captured workers’ perspectives in teams through in-depth interviewing and 




most have only marginally considered organizational structure and authority (Ross 













Chapter 5:  Results 
 
 
The results reported here test the “flat thesis” by focusing on worker 
hierarchies in software companies.  To evaluate worker hierarchies in this study, I 
focused on three primary questions: 1) what formal positions do workers occupy in 
the organizational structure?; 2) how is decision-making authority distributed among 
workers?; and 3) do workers experience upward mobility in their organizations?  I 
have constructed a typology of worker hierarchies, which weaves together evidence 
that addresses these questions. 
In order to fully appreciate the relative positioning of worker hierarchies, it is 
also helpful to understand the broader organizational context within which these 
worker hierarchies are situated.  Therefore, I begin reporting results by briefly 
looking at the organization as a whole.  It is my intention that this holistic approach 
will help our broader understanding of the depth between workers and the top of the 
organization, and keep us conscious of the decisions affecting work which remains 
entirely with management.  This introduction will set the stage for evidence presented 
on worker hierarchies, which comprise the focus of this analysis.   
As stated earlier, I differentiate between workers and managers in this study.  
By workers, I mean those individuals who directly execute the design and 
development of software products.  I do not evaluate managers who focus exclusively 
on administrative and managerial tasks.  These full-time managers comprise a 




consider John2, who worked as the Vice President of Product Development at a 
software company.  In a position of middle management, he saw hierarchy above and 
below his position. 
When it comes down to it, there’s a clear chain of command.  I know exactly 
what I’m – [the CEO] tells me exactly what I’m responsible for.  And then I 
delegate that and tell people what they’re responsible for. 
(John, VP of Product Development, Company D) 
John’s comments reflect a common observation in software firms.  Not only did a 
chain of command exist, but individuals understood it and their position within it, if 
only subconsciously.  Furthermore, these hierarchical relations existed among both 
managers and workers themselves. 
By drawing widely on interview transcripts, I was able to trace the structure 
and flow of these chains of command3.  When I compared these organizational 
structures, I found some variation existed between organizational hierarchies, 
particularly in the number of layers of management, which generally varied with 
company size.  The fact remained, however, that all companies did adopt a 
managerial hierarchy.  Furthermore, there was considerable continuity in the positions 
and organization of worker hierarchies and the worker-management interface.   
Based on these chains of command, I constructed an ideal-typical 
organizational chart of software companies (I have chosen not to look at other 
departments, such as Sales or Human Resources, and focused only on Software  
                                               
2 Actual names of all respondents and their companies have been removed to maintain confidentiality.  
Pseudonyms have been used in their place. 
3 Using available information, I was able to reconstruct organizational charts for half (16 of 31) of the 
companies in the sample.  I lacked information to reconstruct an adequate chart for the remaining 15 




Figure 1.  Ideal-Typical Organizational Structure of Software Companies 
                    
      Hierarchy  Relevant Titles/Positions   
            
       Executive/Upper Management  CEO; President 
              
              
  Managerial     Middle Management  CTO; COO; CFO; Vice President (VP) of Technology;  
  Hierarchy         VP of Product Development; VP of Engineering; Consultant . 
              
       Lower Management  Director of Development; Director of Software Developmnt; . 
           Engineering Manager; Development Manager; Program    
  Manager-            Manager; Technical Director; Creative Director   
  Worker       Project Manager  Project Manager 
  Interface               
              
  Worker     Team Lead  Technical Lead; Project Leader; Team 
  Hierarchy         Leader/Team Lead 
              
       Developer  Developer; Programmer; Software Engineer; 
         Junior/Senior Software Engineer; Associate 
         Engineer; Software Engineer A/B;  
         Programmer Analyst; Architect 
                    
 
Development).  This chart is represented in Figure 1.  At the top of the hierarchy is 
the management hierarchy, which I represented simply as Executive/Upper 
Management, Middle Management, and Lower Management.  I have also identified 
the titles that correspond to each layer of management.  No organizations had all titles 
that are listed and managerial hierarchies normally had two or three, and sometimes 
four layers.  For example, at Company K, the CEO sat atop the managerial hierarchy, 
with the Vice President of Engineering reporting to him, and the Director of 
Development, and Project Manager, at respectively lower levels below.  At Company 





In most organizations, the Project Manager was the interface between workers 
and managers.  I have included it in both the worker and management hierarchies 
because the Project Manager often performed development duties, in addition to 
his/her managerial responsibilities.  This dynamic is explored in greater detail below.  
Under the Project Manager is the Team Lead, and finally developers are at the bottom 
of the hierarchy.  Most organizations had both a Project Manager and Team Lead, but 
this was not true in all cases.  However, even in their absence, respondents often 
referred to them as typical positions in the industry.  Developers had the most variety 
in titles within their position (e.g. Associate Engineer, Programmer, Junior/Senior 
Software Engineer, etc.).  While some of these positions implied hierarchy (i.e. 
Junior/Senior Software Engineer), there was no differences in formal decision-
making authority or supervisory relationships within these positions and they have 
been subsequently grouped together.  Many developers reported that such distinctions 
had no meaning (“titles don’t really count too much” (Anad, Developer, Company I) 
or “titles in the company mean nothing” (John, VP of Product Development, 
Company D), but they did tend to reflect differences in skill levels, experience, and 
often status.   
The existence of hierarchy was nearly universal4 in the software companies 
studied.  Even small companies adopted minimal hierarchical forms that had 
permanent managerial and administrative positions with superordinate positions over 
workers designing and developing software products.  As stated previously, my focus 
                                               
4 One company, Company G, did appear to be truly flat.  However, this company had only three 
individuals who created the organization as a limited liability partnership.  Karl, a Founder and 
“Principle” of Company G, reported, “in order to be three equal partners, we're sharing the decisions, 
and sharing the revenue.”  He and his partners avoided arranging themselves hierarchically because “a 




is specifically on the worker hierarchy within these organizations. I found that the 
organizational structure of these worker hierarchies can be classified into two general 
and distinct hierarchical forms.  First, there are dedicated hierarchies with relatively 
static vertical relationships that reflect many of our traditional notions of 
organizational hierarchy.  Second, there are more dynamic project-based hierarchies, 
where selected workers temporarily assume superordinate positions, and are 
subsequently de-activated from their position and replaced by another worker as 
projects reach completion.  Each of these forms are explored below. 
The images of organizational work charts given above accurately portray 
formal positions and implicitly assume delegation of authority and power 
relationships.  However, such assumptions do not necessarily reflect daily work 
practices.  To understand the nature of the relationships, we must “bring work back 
in” (Barley and Kunda, 2001; Barley, 1996) by evaluating worker experiences and 
meanings.  Within these positions, how is decision-making authority distributed?  Do 
workers experience vertical mobility between positions?  Answers to these questions 
are woven together to construct an understanding of the two hierarchical forms 
(dedicated hierarchies and project-based hierarchies).  Accordingly, the focus shifts 
from the abstracted role of various positions to the concrete experiences of workers 
and managers occupying those roles. 
 
Dedicated Hierarchy 
In a dedicated hierarchy, superordinate and subordinate workers maintain 




understood boundaries; titles tend to reflect and communicate such boundaries.  
These boundaries and vertical relationships are understood within the three positions 
of the worker hierarchy and worker-management interface: Project Manager, Team 
Lead, and Developer. 
Project Manager 
The Project Manager’s duties are diverse.  Just some of the Project Manager’s 
responsibilities include communicating between clients and the development group, 
interfacing with management, sales, and development, drafting requirements 
documents for new projects, and coordinating the design of new projects.  However, 
the position of Project Manager cannot be viewed as simply a managerial position.  
Rather, in many companies, large and small, the Project Manager is directly involved 
in designing and coding of software products.  In other words, they both managed the 
software development process and developed the software itself, but they did tend to 
dedicate more of their time to managing.  The extent to which their tasks covered 
either managerial or development duties varied both across and within organizations.  
Accordingly, the Project Manager position ambiguously represents both the worker-
management interface and the pinnacle of the worker hierarchy.  For instance, Syd is 
a Project Manager that does coding occasionally, but focuses mostly on managerial 
responsibilities.  





A bit, on some of the smaller ones I had to lend some coding help.  That was 
mainly for projects that were less than a month in scope, two to three 
resources.  The big ones I haven’t. 
(Syd, Project Manager, Company C) 
In other (often larger) companies, Project Managers may “just mange perk charts and 
everything, and they don't even know anything about programming” (Kevin, Team 
Lead, Company M).  In addition to variation across companies, there was also 
differences among Project Managers within companies.  Trey is a Developer who has 
worked for both types of Project Managers. 
There are project managers who … are close to senior software engineers, and 
the project managers that are closer to being just plain managers.   
(Trey, Developer, Company K) 
Regardless of the distribution of coding and managerial duties, Project Managers 
required certain levels of technical skill.  This is evidenced in the fact that many 
Project Managers interviewed were actually upwardly mobile developers and 
architects.  In some cases, such as John, Developers were promoted to Project 
Manager, and continued their climb through the managerial hierarchy. 
Question: What position did you come on as? 
A developer. 
Question: So you went from developer to— 
Project Manager, to Director of Operations for the East.  I used to run 
Operations for the East.  From there, I went to—I had a lot of success at sales 




development, and I managed all the new offices … and then, from there, VP 
of Product Development. 
(John, VP of Product Development, Company D) 
Nonetheless, a few companies had professional managers with only supplemental 
technical training.  However, many developers spoke negatively of non-technical 
project managers, which confirms previous findings (Zmud 1982). 
 Despite responsibilities in coding and software development, Project 
Managers maintained superordinate positions, over other workers (i.e. Team Leads 
and Developers).  Project Managers reported directly to managers higher up in the 
hierarchy, such as a Director of Engineering or Vice President of Software 
Development.  They were responsible for individual projects and the individual 
workers assigned to those projects.  Syd, the Project Manager who stated earlier that 
he does occasional coding, made this relationship explicit. 
Basically you have a fairly hierarchical vertical structure.  You’re supposed to 
have every project manager managing a project, every project manager 
reporting to a director. 
(Syd, Project Manager, Company C) 
As part of the management team, Project Managers reported participating in higher-
level decision-making functions.  For example, they determined the number of 
“resources” (Developers) necessary for a project and in some companies, they 
assisted in developing the budget.  Developers and Team Leads rarely participated in 




individual pieces were negotiated between Developers and managers, Project 
Managers made the final decisions. 
While the team lead was most often the position directly below the Project 
Manager, the Project Manager also assisted in the management and supervision of the 
Developers.  This management relationship included a number of directives and 
means of control over the work of Developers.  Ahmet, the Co-founder and CTO of 
one company, identified their Project Managers’ role in task assignment. 
The project manager really has the authority and the judgment to say “Hmm, 
I’ve done a skills assessment and I think this person is better capable of doing 
this than this person.” 
Question: Do the members of the team have some say in what they’re 
assigned to? 
They do.  Sometimes you get volunteers, saying “hey, I really want to work 
on this.”  Sometimes you have to play Spock, and you’re to say “Sure, I know 
you want to work on this, but in the interests of time and the fact that we don’t 
want a lot of R&D, I’d like X, Y, Z to work on it because, you know, they’ve 
really done it before.” 
(Ahmet, Co-founder/CTO, Company L) 
At Company L, Project Managers did not exhibit direct control of assignment of 
tasks.  Instead, Developers were given opportunities to volunteer for and give input 
on tasks they wanted.  However, it was the Project Manager who got to make the final 
decision.  The assignment process was done informally, with the goal of seeking 




fact, this authority was common across many organizations and decisions.  A Project 
Manager at Company J, Jack, reiterated this authority. 
Question: Is there one person who’s kind of in charge of [task assignment], or 
is it more of a communal offering? 
I have the final say on kind of everything that happens, so I put myself at the 
top. 
(Jack, Project Manager, Company J) 
According to Jack, he had the final say on “everything” with Developers.  Other areas 
of decision-making attributed to Project Managers included setting deadlines, the 
level of documentation necessary in coding, hiring, firing, and promotions.  At 
Company D, Project Managers were also responsible for monitoring the actual coding 
and selecting relevant features in a software product.   
One of the biggest challenges for a Project Manager, and something that I'd 
like to think I was always good at—developers have this inherent quality, if 
you will, where they want to build a monument to themselves. And they 
introduce complexity, because, "It would be really cool if I could do this 
thing. And it provides me with all of this future ability to do something the 
customer's not asking for." So as a Project Manager, as a manager in any 
respects, you look for those people who like to build a monument to 
themselves. You keep an eye on those people. And I used to come back to 
them, say, "It's got to be simpler than that." 




This struggle between Developers and Project Managers (and to a lesser 
extent, Team Leads) was a common occurrence in these software companies.  
Developers often favored writing “elegant code” that was “cool.”  We know from 
recent studies on computing culture (Himanen 2001; Case and Pineiro 2006) that the 
writing of such “beautiful” and “aesthetically appealing” is encouraged within the 
profession.  In fact, status rewards can accrue to those who have demonstrated such 
coding skills.  However, managers, including Project Managers, have different 
priorities.  They are under constant market pressure to make productive use of their 
resources (including Developers) and the time necessary to write such code (or 
“monuments”) comes at the expense of other projects and tasks.  Accordingly, this 
hierarchical authority over workers serves the interests of the founders and owners to 
improve the surplus of software development. 
 These comments have demonstrated that Project Managers occupy a formal 
position between the worker and managerial hierarchies, while existing in both 
simultaneously.  They have some authority and input in high-level decisions, and 
significant decision-making authority in production-level decisions.  In most 
organizations, the Project Manager yields significant decision-making authority over 
Team Leads and Developers, but this is not always the case.  Some organizations, 
such as Company C, view this position as more of a coordinating position. 
The Project Manager owns this whole thing and brings in other people, if 
necessary. [But] the team model is based on a team of peers.  And so that’s 
where you have, even though the project manager is responsible for this, the 




 (Roger, Founder/CEO, Company C) 
Accordingly, it is important to keep in mind the variation among organizations in 
distributing power and authority throughout the hierarchy.  Indeed, a few 
organizations did not have anyone in this position.  Nonetheless, Project Managers in 
dedicated hierarchies tended to be technically-trained individuals in formal 
hierarchical positions and given decision-making authority over workers and 
participation in broader organizational processes. 
Team Lead/Leader 
Team leads generally report to the Project Manager, or Director of 
Development/Engineering, if a Project Manager is not present or nonexistent.  In 
dedicated hierarchies, they also blended managerial and development responsibilities.  
But in comparison to Project Managers, they focused more on coding and 
development and less on general and higher-level managerial tasks.  In dedicated 
hierarchies, Team leads were all Developers and designers at some point in the past 
(and in certain ways, they still are) and usually had achieved their position through 
formalized promotion processes.  This was the case for Thom, who started as a senior 
software engineer and was recently promoted.   
This year, um… I get promoted to be Technical Lead. 
Question: What will be the change in responsibilities that will go with that? 
When you work as a software engineer, pretty much you’re responsible for 
your own developments … But if, um, you become Technical Lead, then you 
have much broader responsibilities that you have to work with, a lot more 




(Thom, Team Lead, Company B) 
As Team Lead, Thom gained a managerial, or supervisory position, among the 
developers which gave him more control.  He became responsible for both his own 
work and the work of his team.  When asked if there was a lot of upward mobility at 
his company, Thom indicated that there was. 
This additional responsibility was normal for Team Leads in this type of 
hierarchy.  This added responsibility and control made Team Leads feel and appear as 
quasi-managers.  This point was made by Kevin, a Team Lead, and confirmed by the 
CEO of his company, Company M. 
A lot of companies, larger companies, what they do is they divide the work 
between the manager, who just mange perk charts and everything, and they 
don't even know anything about programming. Sometimes it's difficult to 
work in that environment, but you know, to each their own. And then other 
times, you know, they have a senior engineer, and they're the ones that are 
actually making all the decisions and doing what I would say is the real work 
inside there, and here at Company M, we have a team leader position, which 
is a combination of the both, which...  
Question: Your team leader is also a part manager?  
Well, that's what I'm saying. It's the best of both worlds, in my opinion.  
(Kevin, Team Lead, Company M) 
 
Now a project leader is, I mean, it’s kind of a management position, but, I 




(Michael, CEO, Company M) 
With new responsibilities, Team Leads also attained greater authority over the 
Developers in their team.  They were assigned more decision-making authority in a 
variety of situations.  In traditional hierarchical organizations, this authority is 
normally granted only to managers.  In fact, many of these areas overlapped with the 
authority of Project Managers.  For example, Team Leads, such as Kevin, were often 
responsible for decisions on task assignments. 
I’m the team leader.  I’m responsible for all of my guys, and if they’re not, if 
they’re not doing that, it’s my problem, not theirs … As a team leader you 
have to be able to understand the strengths and weaknesses of everybody on 
your team so you can decide who’s gonna be working what task and where 
they’re going to be placed to best … accomplish the goal, if you will.  And 
that’s pretty much how it works out. 
(Kevin, Team Lead, Company M) 
In addition to task assignment, Team Leads often set deadlines and maintained 
project schedules.   
Question:  How did you all decide on what portions you all would get to 
work? 
Let the team lead take care of that.  She asked us, “Do you have anything in 
particular that you want to work on?”  But the project schedule and who was 
working on what was all decided by the team lead. 




Because they were responsible for their Developers, Team Leads were concerned 
about their the Developer’s productivity.  They monitored individual member’s 
progress and could sometimes sanction team members for not meeting standards or 
objectives.   
However, it was rare for Team Leads to be involved in high-level decision 
making such as company strategy, creating budgets, resource allocation, drafting 
policies and procedures, etc.  These were normally reserved for full-time managers 
and sometimes, Project Managers.  Occasionally, however, Team Leads were given 
higher level authority.  For instance, Team Leads did have some decision-making 
over hiring.   
The project leaders look at the resume, if the resume really looks interesting 
we'll bring the person in and as part of bringing the person in, they sit down 
with them, grill ‘em about what they've done … then we usually take the 
person out to lunch and whatever the team they'd be working with and then a 
few other people from some of the other disciplines. You know, we all throw 
rocks at each other and have a good time and then uh, everybody writes up 
their impressions and staples them together and gives those to the project 
leader, project leader makes an assessment from that, and I either give the 
thumbs up or the thumbs down and I never question those recommendations 
because at that point, you have to trust the process. 
(Michael, CEO, Company M) 
In this case, Michael, the CEO, had formal decision-making authority over hiring new 




new hires, but on the other hand, the CEO always trusted and reiterated their 
recommendation.  His rationale was that “because even if you bring somebody in 
over that kind of recommendation, then what are you saying to your existing 
employees?”  Accordingly, recommendations took more the form of decisions than 
advice.   
 It became clear that many Team Leads understood their position as partially 
managerial, in a vertical relationship to Developers.  Successful developers, like 
Thom, were promoted into the position, thereby receiving additional responsibility 
and decision-making authority.  In many ways, however, the position was spoken in 
terms of coordinating among teams or being a contact person during projects.   
The majority of the responsibility that qualifies them as a lead, they’re going 
to be the ones that coordinate between other groups and, you know, gather 
requirements or discuss what will be necessary from Group A to work with us 
and talk to Group C when they have a request for an enhancement or 
something like that. 
(Salih, Developer, Company E) 
Therefore, the Team Lead should not be thought of entirely as a vertically 
hierarchical position, but one that also coordinates horizontally.  Because the Team 
Leads also do coding and executing the technical design, they do work alongside 
Developers in a way that managers would not. 
Developers 
Developers work at the bottom of the hierarchy in software companies.  




almost never have decision-making authority concerning high-level affairs or 
authority over the concerns of other workers.  While some are able to work their way 
up into the managerial hierarchy, many workers lack the requisite managerial 
training, and are therefore often excluded from positions of power and authority 
within the organization. 
 However, developers do not fit our traditional notions of powerless workers in 
pyramidal bureaucracies.  Despite being in dedicated hierarchies, they do have a level 
of control and authority over production-level decisions and aspects of their own 
position that other types of workers lack.  As professionals, these advantages cover a 
variety of aspects of their jobs.  For example, Developers have task autonomy, where 
they can exercise discretion in determining how best to complete a task, or set of 
tasks.  Eddie, the Director of Development at Company A, makes such a point. 
You have a certain amount of freedom in the things that you can develop here.  
You know, you don’t have… big brother, for example, telling you what 
everything is gonna have to look like and act like.  You have a certain amount 
of freedom to do what you like.  As long as it meets the core requirement of 
doing whatever it’s supposed to do right. 
(Eddie, Director of Development, Company A) 
Regardless of one’s position in the hierarchy, they almost always have time autonomy 
at their jobs.   
The hours are what we make them.  It depends.  Nobody’s punching a clock 




here until some obligation has pulled us away, or we decide that we’ve had 
enough of the office and need to go home and eat, or whatever. 
(Clayt, VP Engineering, Company F) 
These findings are congruent with other research on software workers and 
professionals in general.   
 For some Developers, however, this is not enough for them.  There were times 
when developers felt that information about the company’s status or direction were 
being held from them.  At times, there were decisions made within the organization 
that effected them, for which they felt they had no control over.  For example, Jessica 
enjoyed control over her own position, but was upset with not having decision-
making authority on hiring. 
Question: How much control would you say you have over the decisions that 
affect your position? 
… I think I have good control over that.  What I feel I don’t have control over 
is like we’re hiring all these … visas, and I’m like, “Hello, when are we going 
to stop doing this?”  And I keep saying to [the co-founder], “We’re not getting 
quality people this way”  And [the co-founder] goes, “Well, we’re getting 
them at a pretty good rate.”  I’m like, “Well you get what you pay for.”  You 
know, like, “Look at the situation here.  When are we going to stop this?” 
(Jessica, Developer, Company L) 
Despite this power differential, there appeared to be little conflict or resistance.  In 
actuality, some developers did not indicate dismay at their position’s lack of authority 




aspects of the business, and they indicated they would not want a managerial position 
because it would give them a different focus than developing.  In doing so, they 
normally accepted the unobtrusive commands of management. 
On the other hand, many Developers were interested in attaining greater 
authority and managerial responsibilities in their companies.  Rather than hoping 
management would devolve these responsibilities downward through delayering, they 
sought to climb the organizational hierarchy individually.  Because of the number of 
layers in the organization, they perceived vertical mobility opportunities through the 
hierarchy.  While he was still a Developer, Eric envisioned such a path for himself. 
There’s a lot of different positions and different levels within the company, 
lots of opportunities, things going on.  So I would like a career with a 
company, rather than just to move around every couple of years. 
(Eric, Developer, Company D) 
Smaller companies often had less opportunities for vertical mobility, but Developers 
did not always see this as a permanent limitation for their upward mobility.  Instead, 
they envisioned organizational growth that would allow them such access to a blend 
of development and managerial tasks. 
My titles probably changed because we are supposedly growing, you know, 
we are growing, we’re hiring more people, and, um, eventually I will be doing 
more management, versus just execution of the tasks. 
(Nam, Developer, Company P) 
In sum, Developers did not entirely resemble workers in traditional bureaucracies.  




individual autonomy, but like Team Leads and Project Managers, they still lacked 
decision-making and even input on higher-level decisions.  They did perceive vertical 
mobility opportunities through these respective positions, commensurate with levels 
in the worker hierarchy, and even possibilities of mobility within managerial 
hierarchies. 
Project-Based Hierarchy 
In each of the positions of a dedicated worker hierarchy, the individuals 
occupying those positions were stable over time.  That same individual occupied that 
position from one project to the next, until he or she would leave the company or get 
promoted into another “permanent” position.  When Thom got promoted from being a 
“Senior Software Engineer,” his title and responsibilities changed, then becoming 
“Technical Lead.”  In other words, he became dedicated to that position, and once he 
attained that position, his role remained stable and consistent over time.  After time 
there, he may have been promoted to Project Manager, or another higher position, or 
eventually left the company, but he probably would have never returned to his 
position as Developer.  This is certainly no profound observation, as it matches our 
traditional notions of organizational hierarchy.  The interesting part, however, is that 
not all of the organizations sampled fit this profile. 
Instead, some organizations adopted what I have called a project-based 
hierarchy.  Workers could be assigned, removed from, and re-assigned into lead 
positions from project to project.  Unlike in dedicated hierarchies, when developers 
were assigned as Team Leads, their title did not change and this was not viewed as a 




I’m not sure what [title]’s written on [the lead’s] business card right now.  I 
know people whose title have changed six times, and it’s not because their 
responsibilities have necessarily changed that much.  …  There’s someone 
who’s acting as a lead right now because of a project that we’re working on, 
but not in an everyday sort of sense. 
(Salih, Developer, Company E) 
In project-based hierarchies, the Team Lead was not a permanent position and 
different Developers served as Team Leads on different projects.  During the project, 
they particularly acquired greater authority in production-level decisions.  Anad made 
this similar point. 
To be frank, titles don’t really count too much [laughter].  I’ve pretty much 
had, uh, the same set of responsibilities of maybe about, less than a month…in 
a month’s time, I had the same set of responsibilities that I had then till now.  
Its just been growing, as things change and things improve and uh, I pretty 
much take up the lead in designing and uh, conceptualizing and strategizing 
products.  Uh, I also take up the lead in managing the system and setting up 
one part exclusively and another person takes up uh, the same way and trying 
to manage the site, if we have a site coming up, trying to set it up, uh, 
managing different boxes.  
(Anad, Developer, Company I) 
Project Managers and other managers are still located atop worker hierarchies 
in this organizational form.  In general, managerial hierarchies are stable and 




and Team Leads that change.  In a project-based hierarchy, the worker hierarchy is 
constructed, deconstructed, and re-constructed as projects are completed and replaced 
by new ones.   
We have technical leads.  They would not be titled.  Okay, we had like a 
Project Manager and Technical Lead.  So Technical Lead would be a senior 
technical guy just advising the team.  Technical Lead, because that was more 
on a project by project basis … but he wasn’t their boss, real boss, because 
they worked on different projects under different bosses.   
(Antonio, Co-founder/COO, Company O) 
Because individual developers move into and out of the Team Lead position, it is not 
part of anyone’s title.  They fulfill much of the same role as Team Leads in a 
dedicated hierarchy, but serve more of an advisory function.  Because of this 
temporality, team leads are not viewed as fulfilling managerial roles in a project-
based hierarchy.  They were not viewed as “bosses”, or supervisors, in the normal 
(vertical) sense of the word.  Another Team Lead, Samir, bounced back and forth 
between designing and leading on different projects.  He reiterated Antonio’s 
conception of the Team Lead, in terms of its temporality and lesser authority. 
There’s an authority structure below [the Creative Director] if there’s a 
project, and someone has been appointed the design lead.  And then they kind 
of are saying how stuff is going, but you know it’s not like they’re your boss 
at that point. 




In project-based hierarchies, the Team Lead’s position is characterized by ambiguity.  
On the one hand, the Team Lead is given authority over a project.  They may assign 
tasks, monitor project status, and manage the various components.  On the other hand, 
the Team Lead is not considered the Developer’s boss.  Instead, they report to a 
Director or Project Manager.  Samir’s comments reveal another important point about 
the Team Lead.  At Company N, Team Leads are “appointed” by a Director, another 
indicator of the hierarchy existing above the workers.  The Team Leads are not peer-
elected positions and they are not shared equally among workers.  This was the norm 
among project-based hierarchies. 
In a project-based hierarchy, the Team Lead generally had less decision-
making authority than a Team Lead in a dedicated hierarchy.  The Lead will often 
still make task assignments and shape project deadlines, but they are much less likely 
to sanction co-workers and make hiring decisions.   
I’m still like one of their peers, you know?  So… I-I am… it’s difficult for me 
to face someone … one of these people face to face … “this is what you’re 
doing wrong.”  And you know, if I was an authority figure here, it would be a 
different thing, but I’m not, you know?   
(Samir, Developer/Team Lead, Company N) 
In either case, they will almost never shape company strategy, design policies and 
procedures, decide on pay scales, and set budgeting priorities.  These were reserved 
for dedicated managers. 
Finally, in project-based hierarchies, Developers perceived less vertical 




Lead was not seen as a promotion, because it was a temporary assignment and many 
Developers could achieve Team Leads on different projects.   
Question: Overall, do you see a lot of mobility amongst the developers? 
Not really.  Everyone, you know, I think has gained a lot of experience 
working here.  But because of the size of the organization and … what 
direction we’re moving in, there’s not a lot of room for growth from a 
management or organizational standpoint.  Your skills will grow, but there’s 
not really any room for you to branch out and do more management.  You 
might manage a particular project by creating a particular section of the 
application.  But, overall, we’re very targeted. 
(Salih, Developer, Company E) 
At Company E, workers were highly specialized and focused.  Unlike workers in 
many other software companies, they did not have opportunities to expand into 
managerial tasks as dedicated Team Leads or Project Managers did.  With fewer 
layers in the worker hierarchy, the project-based hierarchy could be more flat, relative 
to dedicated hierarchy.  The Team Lead position is less of a layer in the hierarchy.  
They remain more flexible from project to project and access to the Team Lead role is 
temporary and fluid. 
 In sum, there were several important differences between dedicated and 
project-based hierarchies.  While the managerial hierarchies are similar in those two 
forms, the worker hierarchies (especially the Team Lead position) and mobility 
patterns are considerably different.  In a dedicated hierarchy, a Developer acquires the 





Table 1.  Comparison of Dedicated and Project-based Hierarchies   
       
              




Hierarchy   
  Temporality of Worker Hierarchy  Stable, Consistent  Fluid, Reconfigurable   
  Temporality of Managerial Hierarchy  Stable, Consistent  Stable, Consistent   
  Use of Teams  Yes  Yes   
  Authority of Team Leader (TL)  More authority  Less authority   
  Mode of Acquisition for TL  Promoted  Assigned/Replaced   
  Developer Has Same Supervisor        
     From Project to Project  More common  Less common   
              
 
more authority.  There are three primary layers in the worker hierarchy (Project 
Manager, Team Lead, and Developer) with mobility among them.  While this 
organization is stable and consistent, the project-based worker hierarchy is fluid and 
reconfigurable.  Developers are temporarily appointed to the Team Lead position, but 
gain relatively less authority.  Without this layer of hierarchy, Developers perceive 
less vertical mobility.  Table 1 highlights these main differences.   
 
Promoting the Ideology of Flatness 
It is clear that neither dedicated nor project-based hierarchies are the 
traditional hierarchical form written about in Weber’s ideal-typical bureaucracy or 
promoted by Taylor’s scientific management.  They are of a different type, or types, 
of hierarchy.  In these new structures, some decision-making has been devolved to 
workers, and they have gained autonomy over certain areas of their jobs, such as 
limited authority over the organization of work, and task and time autonomy.  They 
are self-managed to a degree, but at the same time, hierarchy does remain.  Much 




career tracks remain, although not entirely, in vertical paths.  Significant decision-
making authority at the production-level has been devolved to workers, but authority 
is often further stratified among workers in the worker hierarchy.   
This dual perception of hierarchy is no accident.  Executive officers 
repeatedly discussed strategic utilization of informality, openness, and shared 
decision-making with workers, or developers/engineers.  Luke, the CEO and founder 
of his company, found that this environment can increase efficiency. 
I also find it to be productive that when something comes up that is not 
confidential that [the engineers] can hear about it, that they can feel like, “hey, 
I am involved in the whole process by the way he is doing the deal.” Or 
talking to an investor while that is exciting. I can learn from that or I can 
understand the whole process better when they all contribute.  
Question: How much input do they have?  
Lots of input. At the end of the day I make the decisions.  That's the way it has 
to be I guess. You got to have a hierarchy at some level. You have to work. 
(Luke, Founder/CEO, Company H) 
Luke permitted openness and solicited input in a strategic manner, but only when it 
does not get in the way of his control over the organization.  Worker participation in 
decision-making did have economic benefit to the company, but he was clear about 
being the decision-maker.  He legitimated this supposed need for hierarchy in terms 
of fulfilling organizational needs.  John, a VP of Product Development, 




Most of the people on the team, except for some of the newer people, are 
more than comfortable with walking in here, shutting the door and talking 
candidly.  And that’s kind of the lack of chain of—if you think about it, that’s 
kind of the lack of chain of command, the fact that people feel comfortable 
talking candidly … but when it comes down to it, there’s a clear chain of 
command.  I know exactly what I’m – [the CEO] tells me exactly what I’m 
responsible for.  And then I delegate that and tell people what they’re 
responsible for. 
(John, VP of Product Development, Company D) 
For John, a high degree of informality and accessibility in interpersonal interactions 
does not mean equality and flatness in positional authority within the organization.  
Hierarchy still remains in his company, despite greater ability to talk frankly with 
individuals at different levels.  For Ahmet, a CTO and founder, a flatter, more equal 
distribution of decision-making authority would harm the company.  
You have to be democratic at the right times.  And you have to be socialist at 
the right times.  You can’t afford to be democratic all the time because it will 
hurt you, ‘cause you can’t afford to leave decision-making to, you know, 
everyone in the company.  But certain cases, you have to make them feel, you 
have to enable them, you have to let them know that they’re participating in 
the process by being democratic. 
(Ahmet, Founder/CTO, Company L) 
For Ahmet, being a “socialist” meant  being autocratic.  According to him, the 




company.  For Ahmet, workers did not have the capacity, or maybe the incentive, to 
make the appropriate decisions.  However, he felt that to maximize their productivity 
and get them to accept his decisions, he required their consent.  To do so, he fostered 
an ideology of democracy and flatness.   
As we can see from these quotes, workers are subordinated, vis-à-vis 
management, through formal positions and decision-making authority.  Behind an 
ideology of democracy, involvement, and participation, there exists a clear 
hierarchical structure that influences the distribution of power and authority between 
management and workers.  Management, while allowing certain decision-making to 
devolve to workers, was strategic in their selection of worker participation, and 
targeted types of authority (high-level versus production-level) to specific positions 
within the organization.  The evidence shows that this hierarchical distribution 
extends into both the managerial and work hierarchies, even if those worker 
hierarchies are less rigid than traditional bureaucracies. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 The evidence presented here reveals many interesting things about hierarchy 
in software companies.  First, worker hierarchies existed as components within 
broader organizational hierarchies.  Worker hierarchies were positioned below 
managerial hierarchies with varying (2-4) levels.  Together, they comprised a multi-
tiered structure. 
 Second, worker hierarchies maintained similar positions across the 




worker hierarchies used teams and were positioned under stable managerial 
hierarchies, the relationships among these positions were different in dedicated and 
project-based hierarchies.  In dedicated hierarchies, individuals were fixed, or 
dedicated, to their positions.  The structure of the hierarchy was stable and consistent 
over time.  Developers were promoted into the Team Lead position and gained 
significant authority over their subordinates.  Team Leads and Developers were 
respectively more likely to work below the same Project Managers and Team Leads 
from project to project. 
 In a Project-Based Hierarchy, worker hierarchies were much more fluid and 
reconfigurable.  Developers were temporarily assigned (by managers) to function as 
Team Lead on a given project.  The assignment was not viewed as a promotion 
because the Developer would later be unassigned at the project completion, and 
would function as a Developer on other projects.  In this temporary position of a 
authority, the Team Lead was granted some decision-making authority but was not 
viewed as the Developers’ supervisor in the same way as a dedicated hierarchy.  This 
resulted, in part, because Developers were more likely to work for different Teams 
Leads and Project Managers on different projects. 
 Several conclusions may be drawn from the flatness of these companies’ 
hierarchies.  First, in the general literature, flattening out explicitly and implicitly 
refers to the delayering or reduction of hierarchical levels.  It is assumed that 
delayering results in the diffusion of decision-making authority (Harley 1999), and 




of organizational restructuring.  The evidence here portrays a much more nuanced, 
and perhaps multidimensional, picture.  
 In order to tease out these several nuances, it is helpful to compare these 
organizational hierarchies with ideal-typical organizational bureaucracy.  The 
traditional bureaucracy is known to have a high number of layers between top and 
bottom.  At the bottom of the hierarchy, workers’ decision-making authority in both 
high-level functions (i.e. resource allocation; budgeting; hiring, firing, and 
promotions; drafting policies and procedures; the distribution of rewards) and 
production-level functions (i.e. developing schedules and setting deadlines; 
documentation requirements; coding standards, including complexity; selecting 
features for a project; task assignment) is low.  Furthermore, workers rarely have 
input on such matters.  Workers also have very little individual autonomy (i.e. task 
and time aunotomy).  However, because of the rigid pyramidal hierarchy, workers 
had high opportunities for vertical mobility and paths were clearly defined.  
 On the other hand, the number of layers in sampled software companies 
would be less than those in traditional bureaucracies.  But like traditional 
bureaucracies, workers rarely had decision-making authority, or even input, in high-
level decisions.  Workers did have greater authority in production-level decisions, but 
even here such authority was distributed hierarchically among both management and 
workers.  Production-level decisions were split between workers and management, 
with workers having a high level of input.  As Wright et al. (1995) discuss, the ability 
to offer input and make decisions are not equal.  Decision-making authority is a gate 





Table 2.  Comparing Hierarchies in Traditional Bureaucracies and Software Hierarchies 
              
    Traditional  Software   
  Elements of Hierarchy  Bureaucracy  Hierarchies   
  Number of Layers  high  low-med   
  Workers make high-level decisions  low  low   
  Workers input on high-level decisions  low  low   
  Workers make production-level decisions  low  med   
  Workers input on production-level decisions  low  high   
  Workers have individual autonomy  low  high   
  Opportunities for and Clarity of Vertical Mobility  high  low-med   
              
 
organization, while the solicitation of input guarantees no such control.  Nonetheless, 
the degree of input and informal advice offered by Developers was not entirely trivial, 
in comparison to traditional bureaucracies.  Managers sometimes relied on the expert 
advice of their Team Leads and Developers (e.g. in hiring new Developers).  
Furthermore, workers exercised high levels of individual autonomy, but had lesser 
opportunities for vertical mobility.  Table 2 summarizes these differences between 
traditional bureaucracies and the hierarchies of software companies sampled here. 
 Finally, the degree of input and decision-making that was devolved to workers 
was not a universal or benign shift in authority.  Rather, managers strategically 
permitted workers authority to promote the ideology of “democracy”, “participation”, 
or flatness.  Devolving such decision-making authority to workers not only provided 
economic advantages of flexibility and knowledge utilization, but also obfuscated 
more explicit authority attributed to these positions.  Supervisors and managers were 





Chapter 6:  Discussion 
 
The findings in this study provide little support that hierarchies have been 
replaced by flat, horizontally coordinated structures.  This empirical analysis has 
demonstrated that a more nuanced form of organizational restructuring has occurred, 
with varying dimensions of flatness.  The optimistic idea that hierarchies have 
become obsolete and that they have been replaced by more flat and humane team-
based structures is more a by-product of conceptual inversion (and perhaps wishful 
thinking!) than empirical analysis.  In the words of Barley and Kunda (2001: 77), 
“conceptual inversion occurs when theorists formulate images of postbureaucratic 
organizing by contrasting traditional models of organizing with their perceived 
opposites.”  Concepts such as “network organization” have emerged and been 
presented as the opposite of hierarchy and bureaucracy to create sharp contrasts 
between past and present.  These sharpened concepts have since become fads, much 
like Post-Fordism did in the 1980s and worker empowerment did in the 1990s 
(Harley 1999).  In this debate (and likely in the case of other such fads), such inverted 
claims of flatness have not been tested (with the exception of Rajan and Wulf (2006), 
who empirically assessed the flattening of managerial hierarchies).  The evidence 
presented above fills this void by constructing an empirically-grounded image of 
modern forms of organizational structures in software development companies. 
The findings presented in this study favor the rejection of such conceptual 
inversions that have plagued much of organizational theorizing on “postbureaucratic” 




companies did not exhibit the flat structures of entirely horizontally-networked teams.  
Barker’s (1993: 416) ethnographic study of a small manufacturing company 
identified a two-tiered structure whose worker teams “had to negotiate such 
supervisory issues as accepting responsibility, making decisions, and setting their 
own ground rules for doing good work, such as deciding who was going to perform 
which tasks, whether or not the team needed to work overtime or on weekends, and 
whether to hire or fire team members.”  In the companies studied here, like most 
other organizations (Acker 2006: 446; Harley 1999), power within the company and 
high-level decision-making remained almost entirely at higher managerial levels.  
Developers, Team Leads, and to some extent, Project managers, had virtually no 
control over company goals, strategy, resources and budgeting, the distribution of 
rewards, and company policies and procedures, including those for promotion, and 
firing workers.  Furthermore, decision-making authority remained stratified within 
both managerial hierarchies (Rajan and Wulf 2006) and worker hierarchies.  Many 
companies maintained dedicated hierarchies with production-level decisions 
(regarding project specifications and functionalities, schedules and deadlines, coding 
requirements and standards, task assignments, etc.) further stratified by position (i.e. 
among Project Managers, Team Leads, and Developers).   
However, these companies also cannot be considered traditional 
bureaucracies, in the ideal Weberian sense.  Significant decision-making authority has 
been diffused throughout the worker hierarchy and down to Developers themselves 
(Kraft 1999).  Some decision-making was shared by teams with reduced managerial 




autonomy, and input on deadlines, task assignments, and the general organization of 
work.   
In this context, then, what kind of organizational image are we left with?  Like 
the teams studied in Ezzamel and Willmott (1998: 391), the evidence here 
demonstrates “how teamwork reforms and elaborates, rather than replaces or 
eliminates, a traditional hierarchical system of management control.”  Within the 
teams, there was a horizontal division of labor, but clear organizational hierarchies 
operated above and around these teams of Developers.  Coordination was not through 
self-managed teams, peer-elected coordinators, and ad-hoc meetings (Barker 1993), 
but through vertically positioned Project Managers, Team Leads, and other managers 
(in the case of dedicated hierarchies) or Project Managers and assigned Team Leads 
(in project-based hierarchies).  In other words, teams were embedded within 
hierarchical structures.  Furthermore, the image of a networked organization is not 
entirely inaccurate.  Rather, “the claim that organizations are suddenly ‘becoming 
networks’ and that these network are not hierarchical is overstated” (Barley and 
Kunda 2001: 77).  This has not been an act of replacement, but an act of reform and 
modification.  Network analysis remains a valuable means to understand these 
structures, as long as one recognizes that any organization may be understood as a 
network and “that hierarchy is a property of a network’s structure, not something that 
a network replaces” (Barley and Kunda 2001: 78).   
Barley and Kunda (2001) noted these new structures have been described in a 
variety of ways, such as shamrock organizations (Handy 1989), boundaryless 




to name a few.  Such terminology makes it clear that extant concepts and language of 
organizational theory do not capture and reflect the new ways of organizing work and 
structuring organizations today.  Paradoxical concepts such as “flat hierarchies” are a 
reflection of researchers struggling (and failing) to come to terms with the significant 
changes in the restructuring of work.  Barley and Kunda (2001) are right to note that 
new concepts are needed (see also Barley 1996).  Through grounded empirical 
analysis, I have identified and elaborated a new image of organizing work—project-
based hierarchies (in contrast to dedicated hierarchies)—in an effort to better 
understand these changes.  This terminology is meant to simultaneously signal their 
temporal nature in which segments of the hierarchy can be reconfigured from project 
to project, and their embeddedness within hierarchical forms.  It is my hope that it is 
neither a contradiction in terms nor too vague to lose its meaning.  The weight of this 
concept, and any such emergent concepts, however, must stand the test of time and 
depth across a range of organizations. 
It is worth noting that hierarchies did not acquire the same form across all 
organizations.  Rather than pressures of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983), firms developed different means of organizing work among workers.  
Given that companies here operated in similar external environments (including 
geographical, sectoral, and market locations), this finding supports other research 
(Mueller 1994) that suggests that the use of teams and how they are integrated into 
the organizational structure can be shaped by the company’s internal environment.  
Mueller’s (1994) study of automobile companies demonstrated that a company’s 




historical realities, such as the company’s management style and company culture.  
My findings on the different adaptations of team implementation into dedicated 
versus project-based hierarchies supports such a contingency approach.  
Understanding the conditions under which companies adopted a dedicated or project-
based hierarchy, however, was beyond the scope of this study.  My data was also not 
suitable to analyze how such hierarchical structures change over time and the growth 
of the firm.  These two limitations suggest rich areas for future research. 
Finally, we return to Marxist theory to help us understand how the 
restructuring of work is mediated by the conflictual relationship between workers and 
managers.  Based in their differing relationship to the mode of production, workers 
and managers have divergent interests in controlling production (Harley 1999; 
Ezzamel and Willmott 1998).  For example, workers, or Developers at these software 
companies, were motivated by writing elegant code, working on the most interesting 
and challenging projects, working on a variety of different projects, sought control 
over their own work schedule, and were unconcerned with documenting their code.  
However, managers sought code that did the job as simply as possible (“You look for 
those people who like to build a monument to themselves. You keep an eye on those 
people.”), with no additional functionalities, and was properly documented.  They 
assigned tasks mostly based on time and budget restraints (allowing developers to 
select their assignments when project schedules allowed it), sometimes requiring 
developers to work long hours and weekends against their will.  Managers controlled 
how many developers were allotted to specific projects and who was hired, fired, and 




cultural techniques (Kunda 1992; Barrett 2005; Voss-Dahm 2005; Rasmussen and 
Johansen 2005; Marks and Lockyer 2005; Florida 2002) to exercise managerial 
control, these results here show that they continue to exercise power through 
organizational structures as well.  By virtue of their position, managers at various 
levels were responsible for producing surplus-value and ensuring that work was done 
in a manner that guaranteed as great of a surplus as possible.  Furthermore, to reduce 
conflict in the organization, management strategically included Developers in 
decision-making processes “because you have to be democratic at the right times.”  In 
doing so, they promoted an ideology of flatness that obfuscated the hierarchical 




Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
 
 Work organizations have always been important locations for the reproduction 
of much inequality in society (Acker 2006).  However, some scholars have argued 
that the restructuring of formerly hierarchical organizations into flat structures of self-
managing teams has alleviated much organizational inequality and produced a new 
structure of egalitarianism.  This transformation has been understood in the context of 
economic gains delivered by greater flexibility, increased flow of information, and 
motivational qualities of worker autonomy.  Culturally, workers in software 
development have come to expect and demand such autonomy, furthering the push 
toward flat, horizontally coordinated structures. 
 This study was meant to contribute to such debates by evaluating the nature of 
worker hierarchies in software companies.  It has yielded several general conclusions.  
First, my results indicate that companies are not flat, but instead that hierarchies 
remain.  The degree to which they have flattened out depends on the measures of 
hierarchy considered (layers, high-level decision-making, production-level decision-
making, etc.) Secondly, I have outlined several dimensions along which flattening can 
occur and indicated how companies here have become more flat.  Third, I have 
elaborated precisely how teams are embedded within organizational hierarchies 
through the devolution of decision-making authority into quasi-managerial positions 
within the worker hierarchy, and the strategic distribution of authority among those 
positions.  Fourth, I have emphasized the need for new concepts in organizational 




a new form of hierarchical relations (project-based hierarchies).  Fifth, because 
companies exhibited two distinct forms of hierarchy, I highlighted the usefulness of a 
contingency approach in analyzing organizational hierarchies in knowledge work.  
Finally, I argued that the gains in productivity achieved by transforming 
organizational hierarchies into flat, team-based structures, are mediated by the 
divergent interests between management and workers, as characterized within a 
Marxist framework.  Hierarchy, therefore, remains a defining characteristic of 









Sample Questions: Programmer Questionnaire 
 
6.  Has your title changed since joining the company? 
 a) What about the things you do, your functions, have they changed?  Why? 
 b) Have you moved up in the company?  Among programmers? 
 c) How has your salary changed as a result? 
 d) Has there been much mobility among the programmers or not? 
 
7.  We know that some companies have many levels while other companies are very 
flat, can you tell us about the structure of your company? 
  
8.  Are there different titles for different programmers?  What are these and what do 
they represent? 
 
a) Do these different titles mean anything?  Do people with different titles 
perform     
                    different tasks? Have different responsibilities? 
b) Is this true most of the time, or just sometimes?c) Is there some overlap in the   
      tasks performed by programmers with different titles?  PROBE 
             c)   Is every programmer able to do the same things? 
d) What about specialization?  How much are programmers specialized here? 
      e)   Please describe each specialty.  (Languages?) 
         f) Do you ever feel the work you do is routine or over-specialized? Why? 
 
12. Let’s talk about this in relation to a specific project that you’re working on now. 
  
 a) Would you briefly describe this project (or application)? 
 b) Who’s involved at these various stages (programmers/developers, project 
 managers, technical leads)?: 
  a) 
  b) 
  c)?.... 
 c)  Others involved? 
  ~Testing, Implementation, or Release groups ? 
  ~others? 
 d) Is this typical of other projects you have worked on? 
  
 e) For this project, how did this process workout for you? 




 g) Are there any changes you would like to see in this process?  If so, what are 
these? 
 h) How did the implementation of this process change your job? 
 
13. Let's talk a little about the stage during which code for the project is actually 
being  written.   
a) Who were/are the people involved and how were/are they organized? 
b) Who was the team leader? 
c) Others under the leader? 
d) How did you decide on assignments?  Did the programmers have a choice? 
e) Do people always perform the same tasks?  Or do they move around? 
 
14. We've heard a bit about "builds" and other types of regular meetings where 
project members coordinate and compile work and discuss project progress....  
a) Do you have these at your company? What does you company call them? 
b) Do you attend these? Do you participate? 
c) Does someone "run" the meeting? Who? 
 
15.  In general, how does management communicate with you?  
a) Regular meetings or "builds"? 
b) Emails? 
c) Memos? 
d) One-on-one in person meetings 
 
18. We hear a lot about deadlines on projects.... a) How do these affect the hours that 
you work? 
a) Do deadlines ever change or move? 
b) Who creates the deadlines? Did you have any input in this decision process? 
c) Are there any incentives for meeting deadlines or completing project early? 
d) Do you feel that the deadlines are reasonable? 
e) How do you meet deadlines? 
 
25.  How does management manage you? (Probe) 
a) Is there a specific management paradigm at this firm? 
b) Is this ever problematic? 
c) How do you feel about this? 
 
26.  Does management do anything to increase the productivity of code writing? 
 
Sample Questions: Project Manager/Technical Lead Questionnaire 
 
Note: These questions are supplemental to the questions above. 
 





a) What are your specific responsibilities? 
 
13. What is your relationship to the software programmers and developers? 
a) Supervisory/Managerial or Peer or Cooperative? 
 
14. What is your relationship to upper (executive) management? 
 
20. How do the programmers  work with other programmers on this project?  
a) Together or independently?   
b) Where is everybody else when you're working? 
c) Are there any specific problems with this arrangement? 
 
29. How do you manage your programmers?  What is the management 
philosophy/paradigm of this firm? 
 
a) Is this the philosophy you use? 
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